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The Sage Handbook of Frankfurt School Critical Theory 
Chapter 60: Erziehung
1.  The Foundations of Critical Theory and the Critical Theory of Education
The main texts associated with the foundation of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, 1977; 
Horkheimer, 1993a; Horkheimer, 2002a; Marcuse, 2009) develop a distinction between 
‘traditional’ and ‘critical’ theory via a conception of research that seeks to transform the 
established understanding of modern scholarly activity, the relationships between academic 
disciplines and their associated methodologies, and between academic knowledge and 
contemporary society. In this sense, critical theory originates as a critique of theory, in the 
sense of the activity of scholarship and research that informs and, with respect to higher 
education, is considered integral to, modern systems of education. 
Central to Horkheimer’s (1993a: 190-1) understanding of critical theory is its difference from 
a traditional conception of theory which, particularly in ‘Anglo-Saxon universities’ from the 
modern period onwards, conceives of the scholarly production of knowledge according to a 
model of the natural sciences that reflects the dominance of industrial production techniques 
within modern society. In this sense, scholarship is part of humanity’s productive powers, for 
the ‘application of all intellectual and physical means for the mastery of nature’ rests upon 
the ‘knowledge of man and nature which is stored up in the sciences and in historical 
experience’ (Horkheimer, 2002b: 3; 2002a: 213, 226). When intellectual production becomes 
reified as something eternal and natural, however, it leads traditional theory to become 
unreflective of its own historical and social foundations (Horkheimer, 2002a: 194, 191). 
Horkheimer and others establish the project of the Institute for Social Research as a critical 
theory, that is, first and foremost, materialist and dialectical, in the sense of rejecting the 
idealist illusion that the cognitive capacities alone are sufficient to grasp, let alone transform, 
‘the totality of the real’ (Adorno, 1977: 120, 128; cf. Horkheimer, 2002a: 244) and of 
rejecting the empirical facts of positivistic scientific research as something ‘finished 
…indestructible and static’ (Adorno, 1977: 126). 
A number of broad implications for a critical conception of scholarship follow: research must 
renounce its systematic intention (Adorno, 1977: 127, 120), call traditional disciplinary 
boundaries into question by becoming inter- or transdisciplinary (Horkheimer, 1993a: 1; 
Adorno, 1977: 130; cf. Osborne, 2011: 15), and foster a social mode of practice, in the sense 
of undertaking ‘permanent collaboration …in common’ with others (Horkheimer, 1993a: 9-
10) and also overcoming the division of labour that detaches academic research from wider 
society and social life processes (Horkheimer, 2002a: 198, 221-224). Renouncing pretentions 
to disinterestedness, critical theory must speak of what its research means for human and 
social life beyond the narrow sphere of academic scholarship, concerning itself with human 
happiness and its realization through the transformation of society (Marcuse, 2009: 100). 
These early texts from the 1930s have less to say, however, about the dissemination of such 
knowledge through the formal activities of teaching and publication and their connection to 
pedagogical issues of learning and study. In his reflections concerning the ‘transmission of 
critical theory,’ Horkheimer (2002a: 240-1) merely cautions that it is never guaranteed any 
future ‘community of transmitters,’ for this is only assured through an ongoing ‘concern for 
social transformation …aroused ever anew by prevailing injustice.’ When he does indicate 
the role of the Institute in supplementing the ‘educational mission’ of the university by 
fulfilling its teaching responsibilities, there is only the briefest mention given to traditional 
forms of scholarly dissemination through lectures and seminars (Horkheimer, 1993a: 14). 
Where these early texts do critically reflect upon education not merely in the sense of the 
scholarly production of knowledge but a broader sense of dissemination and socialization, 
they tend to focus not on formal education or pedagogical techniques but what, from a 
Freudian-Marxist perspective informed by Erich Fromm, is considered the more significant 
psycho-social moulding of character that takes place in early childhood within the family. For 
Fromm (2005) and Horkheimer (2002c: 109), the patriarchal structure of the bourgeois 
family was crucial to the spirit of capitalist societies to the extent that, regardless of a lack of 
social standing, the father’s powerful socio-economic authority within the family provided a 
‘paternal education’ that accustomed the child to obedience and discretion. This 
psychological organization of the child into the authority-oriented character placed 
fundamental limitations on the capacity for critical thought and resistance within formal 
education, which therefore tends to be disregarded in these early texts. If modern and 
contemporary education is understood in terms of a fundamental relationship between 
research and teaching, then, much of the first two decades of critical theory therefore cannot 
be said to provide a critical theory of education per se.
2. Late Capitalism and the Education Industry
From the post-war period onward, the first and later second generations of the Frankfurt 
School became increasingly concerned with diagnosing the transformations within capitalist 
societies that characterized the new spirit of what they described as late or advanced 
capitalism. A number of characteristics are significant in this context: the changed natures of 
the market following the rise of state and welfare-state forms of capitalism, of labour with the 
rise of technological automation, and of the family following the decline of the family wage 
and the decreasing role of primary socialization. Together, they reflect anxieties regarding 
economic productivity that lead to the unprecedented expansion and development of mass 
systems of schooling, further and higher education in the twentieth century, accompanied by 
the qualitative transformation and what many perceive as the impoverishment of learning, 
teaching and scholarship itself. 
The modern period of European history, Franz Leopold Neumann’s (1936: 28) work 
suggests, can be characterized by the defeat of liberalism in terms of the shift from a 
competitive market economy into a monopolistic one and a liberal state into a mass-
democratic one. Neumann’s (1942: 324-5) analysis of these conditions for the rise of 
National Socialism points in particular to how the party was required to organize the renewal 
of its power through the exertion of state machinery, such that schools and universities 
became subject to increasing control. This control can also be elaborated more generally 
through his investigations of the bureaucratizing effects of monopoly capitalism upon social 
institutions and the insidious way this transforms intellectuals into functionaries of the status 
quo (Neumann, 1953: 932-934).
The increasing necessity for centralized organization, administration and political mediation 
to stabilize commodity exchange has seen the reciprocal interlocking of civil society and state 
within a state-regulated capitalism, Habermas (1991; 1976, 55-57) argues, which gives rise to 
a public sector responsible for the state-subsidized production of ‘collective commodities’ of 
the material and immaterial infrastructure upon which the private sector belongs. This 
enables, for example, an increase in relative surplus value by heightening the productivity of 
labour for capital through the development of the technical forces of production (most 
obviously, for example, public systems of transport and communication).
As industrial work in general became disconnected from the direct exploitation of natural 
elements through the interposition of intermediating technical instruments, so the need for 
natural human qualities such as physical strength diminished and the importance of 
widespread educational and training processes increased (Offe, 1976: 23). Friedrich Pollock 
(1957: 70-1; 204-6) believed automation lead to the ‘very real danger of technological [mass] 
unemployment’ and so the necessity of increasing the average level of intelligence of future 
workers by radically improving and changing educational facilities from childhood onward. 
Such education would need to focus in particular on providing a good knowledge of 
mathematics and science, as well as more specialized training to overcome a shortage of 
engineers and technicians, but it would also be necessary, given the great sense of 
responsibility required to operate within and identify with automated workplaces, to teach 
people how “to get more out of life and to be better citizens”’ (1957: 205-6). 
For Fromm, Horkheimer and Adorno, the authoritarianism of ‘paternal education’ within 
earlier capitalism was connected, as we have seen, to the father’s centrality as the principle 
wage-earner and his dependence on his son for the continuation of his active role in society, a 
gender order centred on the normative ideal of the family wage (Fraser, 1994). Although the 
majority of children are compelled, under these conditions, to identify with reality and so 
submit to the identity of reason and domination, the child who takes what he or she has been 
taught more seriously than the father himself does rebels against the irrationalism concealed 
in this domination and attempts to live up to the truths of these ideals, resisting the demand to 
conform (Horkheimer, 1947: 112-4, 234). As Adorno (2005a: 186) later adds, this process of 
internalization of and painful detachment from the ego-ideal of the father figure – necessary 
for maturity – must be re-enacted a second time with the figure of the teacher. 
In Fromm’s analysis, however, the ‘development of the state capitalist order entails a 
structural change in the bourgeois nuclear family,’ as the male loses the economic and 
patriarchal authority he had previously possessed (Honneth, 1987: 354-5). This has led to the 
diminishing significance of primary socialization of the child, away from the narrow 
continuation of the parents’ life and, through increasing secondary socialization, towards ‘the 
broader one of producing successful individuals who can stand up for themselves in the 
contemporary battle of life’ (Horkheimer, 1974: 11). These changes weakened the sharper 
separation between private and public spheres that had been demarcated by distinct figures of 
social authority and had enabled the traditional bourgeois family to preserve a time and space 
within childhood of pre-capitalist processes of cultivation and socialization unmediated by 
the competitive principles of the market (Horkheimer, 2002c: 114-5, 124; Adorno, 2009: 
153-4; Adorno, 1993: 25). 
With the decline of informal education and the rise of public education, every child becomes 
enclosed from an early age within a system of institutions that constitute ‘the most sensitive 
instruments of social control’ (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1997: 149). From the mid-twentieth 
century onward, this is paralleled by the spread of so-called progressive pedagogical practices 
that, along with declining social status and power of the teaching profession, simultaneously 
weaken the authority figure of the educator (Adorno, 2005a). Adorno (2005a: 188) confesses 
to a being a reactionary towards new ideas in education, in which ‘strictness is being replaced 
by a toleration and readiness to help’ (Horkheimer 1974: 11). Just as the culture industry 
piously claims to be guided by its consumers while, through its advertising and editing 
techniques, secretly drills its required responses into them in such a way it does the listening 
for the listener, so seemingly progressive elements within the education industry may be 
similarly said to perform the thinking for thinker or the learning for the learner.
Key to all these changes, Claus Offe (1973) writes, is the increasing need to increase 
productivity through the use of bureaucratic workers and civil servants of the welfare state.  
As an increasing proportion of capital is invested in fixed infrastructural costs such as 
technology, the attendant fall of that invested in human labour leads to what Marx called the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall, in line with principle that human labour is productive of 
the value of commodities. Late capitalism responds to this economic situation by attempting 
to increase the productivity of labour. For example, even where the control of education 
under National Socialism in the 1930s and 1940s explicitly pursued abhorrent cultural and 
racial aims, Neumann (1942: 350) points out, in private it emphasized its true aim of 
promoting education for work: to take ‘leadership of all from earliest childhood to the oldest 
man, not for social purposes – and I must emphasize this once more – but from the point of 
view of productivity.’ 
Kluge and Negt (2014: 185-6) argue that although capital follows a path of increasing 
abstraction towards a dead system of accumulated labour, it cannot pursue this without 
dirtying its hands with the living. Not even late capitalism, with all the technological forces 
of automation at its disposal, ‘would have any use for individuals whose behaviour is reduced 
to mere reactions’ and so it is increasingly required to turn ‘human consciousness and 
contexts of living into its most important raw material’ (2014: 178-9). As Offe (1984: 94-
100) explains, state power is increasingly required to ‘politically regulate who is and who is 
not a wage-labourer’ on the labour market and to transform dispossessed labour power into 
the commodity form inherent to “active” wage-labour through education. In particular, ‘the 
teacher expends a kind of labour power which, without itself being a commodity, may have 
the purpose of educating labour which is a commodity’ (Offe, 1973: 109-110). This is also 
made possible, Habermas (1976: 55-57) argues, through the ‘governmental organization of 
the educational system, which raises the productivity of human labour through qualification,’ 
an example of state investment in ‘reflexive labour,’ ‘labour applied to itself with the aim of 
increasing the productivity of labour.’ This labour which is ‘not productive in the sense of the 
direct production of surplus value’ but indirectly productive of surplus value to the extent it 
‘systematically alters conditions under which the surplus value can be appropriated from 
productive labour.’ With this ‘systematically managed expansion of the system of continuing 
education,’ for example, academic labour shifts from being ‘a collective natural commodity’ 
to being ‘internalized in the economy cycle’ as ‘a component of the production process itself, 
for ‘the state (or private enterprise) now expands capital to purchase the indirectly productive 
labour power of scientists, engineers, teachers, etc. and to transform the products of their 
labour into cost-cutting commodities’. 
As a consequence of these changes, as Adorno and Horkheimer (1997: xv) make clear, 
although formal education had once been a privilege that rested upon the exploitation and 
suffering of a social division of labour (since the wealth appropriated from the production of 
commodities in the factory paid for the private education and the privileged triumphs of 
culture), in late capitalism it is the melting-down and selling-off of cultural values themselves 
as commodities – by the culture and, we could now add, education industries – that generates 
the capital to purchase new factory and office space for expanded exploitation. The tendency 
to abolish educational privilege through systems of public education, Adorno and 
Horkheimer (1997: 160) therefore conclude, ‘does not open for the masses the spheres from 
which they were formally excluded, but, given existing social conditions, contributes directly 
to the decay of education and the progress of barbaric meaninglessness’. 
The inward assimilation of historical culture via the personal and unique cultivation of the 
individual, which had been the traditional domain of enlightenment Bildung, now gives way 
to the technicized modes of sensibility and behaviour exemplified by instrumental reason, 
including schematized and depersonalized methods of instruction, which increasingly rely on 
technological aids (Horkheimer, 1974: 13, 143). Lacking the enlightenment moment of self-
reflection, the process of socialization connected to Bildung loses its association with human 
reason and freedom and takes on a rigidified necessity once attributed to nature itself 
(Adorno, 1993: 17-18). Since this crisis cannot be entirely explained by the inadequacies of 
the educational systems and their teaching methods, pedagogical reforms alone are not 
sufficient and may even exacerbate this crisis (Adorno, 1993: 15). 
3. Mimetic and Rational Education
The effects of these changes are felt only gradually and often in a more complex or 
contradictory way within the cultural and especially educational spheres, however. As the 
possibility of broader social and political transformation receded, their writings focused upon 
preserving those residues of social life that resisted economic subsumption and, especially 
within the context of the de-nazification of German institutions, came to place increased 
expectation on the potential for bourgeois educational forms to change the psychological 
conditions that permitted the worst excesses of fascism to prevail (Adorno, 2005b: 192-194).
Horkheimer (1947: 114-5) insists that one specific psychological mechanism is particularly 
crucial to learning in ‘those early and all but unconscious stages of personal development that 
determine the individual’s eventual character’: the ‘mimetic impulse of the child’ in which 
‘the whole body is an organ of mimetic expression.’ While it is impossible to conceive of a 
system of education that could fully do away with the coercive psychological mechanisms of 
reward and punishment associated with paternal education, he nonetheless envisages the 
possibility of eliminating this coercion from the later stages of education (Horkheimer, 
2002c: 109-111): ‘Cultural progress as a whole, as well as individual education, i.e. the 
phylogenetic and ontogenetic processes of civilization, consist largely in converting mimetic 
into rational attitudes.’ Phylogenetically, this occurs through the transvaluation of these 
mimetic impulses, first through religion and then critical reasoning; ontogenetically, through 
rational education. This transformation of the mimetic impulses into conscious adaptation 
eventually permits a form of ‘domination’ over external objects that Horkheimer had earlier 
associated with the ‘mastery of nature’ through scientific knowledge. The mimetic impulse is 
never fully overcome, though, and ‘lies in wait, ready to break out as a destructive force’ 
whenever the rational fulfilment of human potentiality – the promise of happiness – is 
curtailed (Horkheimer, 1947: 117). 
The antagonistic social dimensions inherent to education therefore connect individual 
socialization within the family to the more general tensions of cultivation that Freud had 
explored in Civilization and its Discontents, developed in terms of the mastery of nature by 
Adorno and Horkheimer in the Dialectic of Enlightenment. According to Adorno and 
Horkheimer, the enlightened mastery of nature, upon which the progressive and scientific 
development of civilization depends, originates through a form of mimetic adaptation, an 
intimate bond of sympathy, similitude or relatedness with things that represents the first 
attempts to control and manipulate nature. Enlightenment regresses to myth at the point 
where enlightened thought ceases to be a means of social emancipation through the mastery 
of nature and instead becomes a form of domination over the social itself. This occurs in part 
because enlightened thought forgets or represses its own dialectical entwinement with, and 
emergence from, nature through the same mimetic impulse it seeks to overcome (Adorno and 
Horkheimer, 1997: 11). Consequently, enlightened thought must accommodate critical 
reflection on this element, which Adorno will later develop in terms of non-identity thinking: 
the ‘remembrance of nature in the subject’ by virtue of which it maintains itself as 
enlightened thought (1997: 49, 41).
A ‘rational education’ would, Horkheimer (1978: 170, 197-8, 223) writes, permit the 
possibility of sublimating aggressive tendencies into the more productive outlets of work and 
knowledge by enabling the capacity for a more critical understanding of wider social causes 
implicated in individual success or failure. The liberal traits of bourgeois culture which must 
not only be preserved but extended to all are therefore those that sought to teach each person 
‘individual self-consciousness, to educate them to the insight that thoughts dwell in everyone, 
that its dignity imparts itself to all’ and that freedom is the freedom to develop one’s 
individual abilities in the context of scientific and technological production, which society 
needs in its struggle with nature. 
Youth ‘must be educated so that it is critical in the face of demagogy,’ acquires ‘the 
categories with which to distinguish demagogy from a truly rational politics’ and becomes 
sensitive enough to any and all persecution that ‘something in them should rebel when any 
individual is not treated as a rational being’ (Horkheimer, 1974: 118). Similarly, Neumann 
(1964: 294-5) is clear that ‘if we wish to prevent a demagogue from using anxiety and 
apathy’ to control society, teachers, students and other ‘citizens of the university’ must 
‘suppress our arrogance, inertia, and our revulsion from the alleged dirt of day-to-day 
politics’ and undertake ‘responsible educational and political activity’ aiming at the 
humanization of politics and the elimination of anxiety. The concept of freedom involves, 
Neumann (1964: 203; 1953: 211-215) writes, ‘the self-determination of man [sic], who must 
have the possibility of unfolding his potentialities’ in terms not just of a negative and juridical 
freedom from constraint but also a positive and rational freedom stemming from the 
‘knowledge of external nature, knowledge of human nature, and knowledge of the historical 
process,’ as well as the volitional freedom to realize this knowledge. These two concepts of 
freedom are mutually connected, Neumann (1964: 213-5) insists, since the former is 
politically necessary for the latter to flourish and since the latter promotes a rational 
organization of society such that individuals can be politically free. Intellectuals must 
therefore organize against the bureaucratic tendencies within research activity, defending the 
principle of academic freedom and struggling for the creation of co-operative communities of 
research. 
In Adorno’s (1993) later writing, this cultivation of intellectual freedom is reconnected with 
Kant’s understanding of enlightenment as the release from self-incurred immaturity 
[Unmündigkeit]. To the extent the education of every individual in political, social and moral 
awareness fosters the autonomous powers of reflection and self-determination, it is the only 
foundation of a democratic maturity capable of ensuring the principle of Auschwitz never 
recurs (Adorno, 2005b). The ‘only real concrete form of maturity would consist of those few 
people who are of a mind to do so working with all their energies towards making education 
an education for protest and for resistance …for “knocking things down’ (Adorno, 1993: 30-
31). This is particularly necessary to supplement the deficiencies of the primary school 
system in rural environments, where television programs and mobile education groups might 
also be required (Adorno, 2005b: 196). This critical theory of education demands ‘the self-
reflection of thinking …a thinking against itself’ and so ‘education toward critical self-
reflection,’ which must include ‘critical reflection on pseudo-education [Halbbilduing], for 
which culture is essential’ (Adorno, 1973: 365; 2005b: 193; 1993, 31). 
Although Adorno’s thought develops the idea of a mimetic remembrance of unreconciled 
nature further, to the extent this experience remains restricted to aesthetic experience it is 
largely excluded from Adorno’s reflection on rational cultivation through education. In their 
preoccupation with preserving or retrieving the bourgeois forms of ‘rational’ education 
inherited from the liberalism of the enlightenment, Horkheimer, Fromm, Pollock Neumann 
and Adorno therefore have a tendency, despite the sophistication of their thought in many 
other respects, to undialectically oppose the mimetic and rational elements of education and 
so perform their own repression of its mimetic aspect. This manifests itself in the self-avowed 
conservativism of their educational attitudes, which can provide a strident criticism of the 
ongoing deformations of education capitalism only at the expense of an attendant critique of 
the liberalism of bourgeois education and consequently of a more dialectical consideration of 
its disintegration under late capitalism.
4. Intersubjectivity: Communication and Recognition 
Subsequent generations of Frankfurt School critical theory, rejecting the Marxist philosophy 
of history that supposedly ‘trapped’ Horkheimer, Adorno and others within the domain of 
social labour and so restricted their vision of social emancipation to the rapidly diminishing 
action of the proletariat, argued that the idea of universal reconciliation with nature, 
according to which the first generation often sought to ‘outdo’ a process of expanding 
reification, must be fundamentally rethought (Honneth, 1979: 46; 1993a: xvii-xviii; 2007: 
65). In particular, the attempt to develop the idea of reconciliation within the framework of 
the philosophy of consciousness lead Adorno to ‘the surrender of all cognitive competence’ 
from the domain of science to that of art and artistic production, placing modern art on an 
equal footing with critical theory in a way that reveals ‘the embarrassment into which critique 
falls due to the loss of innocence of its consciousness as science,’ as Horkheimer had initially 
conceived it (Habermas, 1984: 384; 1973: 241).
Nonetheless, for Habermas (1984: 389-90), Honneth (1979: 46-57) and others (Benhabib, 
1986: 189-190), the hoped for resurrection of a dominated nature through the appeal to a non-
rational or non-conceptual mimetic capacity usefully suggests the possibility of a ‘relation 
between persons in which the one accommodates to the other, identifies with the other, 
empathizes with the other’ and consequently spheres beyond that of art, ‘in which the 
mimetic capacity gains objective shape.’ For Habermas (1984: 382-3), the Dialetic of 
Enlightenment abandoned the more direct path of recognizing, from the ‘inner logics of 
different complexes of rationality …a unity of rationality beneath the husk of an everyday 
practice that has been simultaneously rationalized and reified,’ and so anticipating a domain 
of the social – mutual understanding as the promise of communication free from domination 
– that remained ‘foreign to the tradition of critical theory’ (Honneth 1993a, xii). Here, the 
idea of reconciliation takes up the idea of maturity – autonomy and responsibility within the 
rational domain of communication – in such a way that it not only abandons the metaphysical 
promise of a reconciliation with nature but is predicated upon the continued scientific and 
technological mastery of nature necessary for human survival (Habermas, 2000a: 195-6). 
This theory of communicative action therefore presents one path to take ‘under historical 
circumstances that prohibit the thought of revolution’ (Habermas, 2000b: 216, 226-7; 1984: 
391-2). Eschewing the attendant theory of crisis that justifies the possibility and necessity of 
revolution, Habermas’s (1984: 45, 67-9) materialism generalizes Piaget’s concept of a 
decentration of the egocentric understanding of the world – the stages of cognitive 
development characterized in terms of structurally described levels of learning – to provide a 
social evolutionary perspective upon a world-historical process of rationalization of 
worldviews and lifeworlds. For Seyla Benhabib (1986: 210-12), this is the attempt, after 
Adorno, to conceive the non-identity of the subject not in terms of an aesthetic ideal but a 
moral and political one. Benhabib (1986: 214-5) adds that this solution signifies “self-
actualization” in the Hegelian sense of Bildung, as an ‘educational process in which the 
capacity for reflection and autonomy are developed’ in such a way that the empirical 
individual is transcended, and a transsubjective subject is implied in ‘the cumulative logic of 
the historical process.’ Honneth (1995a: 154-5) similarly sees historical materialism 
transformed, under Habermas, into a ‘theory …of the educational process that has taken place 
in the course of the human species’ history.’
To the extent that the terrain of action, as a site of social struggle, becomes reconceived by 
the second generation of Frankfurt School critical theory in terms of communication or 
recognition, their work returns to the origins of critical theory within the context of a theory 
of intellectual transmission that had been largely passed over in favour of a program of 
intellectual research. Thus Honneth (2007: 67) understands Habermas’s (1984: 8) theory of 
communicative action as recovering ‘the categorial means necessary for a revival of 
Horkheimer’s ideas of social critique,’ promoting transdisciplinarity not only between the 
disciplines of research but also between teaching and research (‘developers of new 
pedagogical methods …should go back to the philosophical presuppositions of different 
fields of study themselves’). 
In Habermas’s (1971: 304-312) early writing the distinct educational and cultural 
implications of Horkheimer’s original conception of a critical theory are developed by 
exposing the cognitive interests that traditional theory had concealed. Habermas (1970: 100-
1; 53-4) comes to understand the changed constellation of late capitalism in terms of the 
predominance of the technical cognitive interests of the empirical-analytical sciences 
(‘control over objectified processes’) without the concomitant practical and emancipatory 
interests of the historical-hermeneutical sciences, from which the former has estranged itself. 
What remains significant for Habermas (1970: 38, 75, 85-7) is not the retreat from science 
through the attempt to conceive some alternative relationship with nature, since this technical 
cognitive interest corresponds to, and cannot be separate from, the logic of purposive-rational 
action of work itself. Rather, what must be countered is the attendant depoliticization of the 
public sphere, as the interaction of reciprocal relationships between subjects under 
intersubjectively comprehensible and binding norms, which therefore excludes from public 
discussion all practical questions concerning scientific and technical control. Understood in 
this context, what Habermas (1989: 118) proposes with the ‘material critique of science and 
scholarship’ is less the rehumanization of nature, in the sense of universal reconciliation, as 
the rehumanization of scholarship. The idea of the university must ultimately be based on a 
scholarship of knowledge directed towards public education and communication: to 
‘transmit, interpret and develop the cultural tradition of society, influencing the self-
understanding of the general public through interpretations provided by the social sciences 
and humanities’ (Habermas, 1970: 4). 
In this, Habermas (1991: 1-4, 159-60) seeks to recover and repoliticize a bourgeois public 
sphere that had originally evolved from the world of letters, expanded to promote the 
enlightened values of critical reasoning through the daily presses, but whose social 
foundations have ‘for about a century… been caught up in a process of decomposition’ and 
so become replaced by the ‘pseudo-public or sham-private world of culture consumption.’ 
With the modern transformation of the liberal constitutional into a social-welfare state, 
publicity becomes extended to all organizations acting in state-related fashion, including 
media-controlled subsystems of the economy, with the result that ‘[t]he same economic 
situation that pressured the masses into participating in the public sphere in the political realm 
denied them the level of education that would have enabled them to participate in the mode 
and on the level of bourgeois readers of journals’ (Habermas, 1991: 231-2; 168). Or, whereas 
once ‘you had to pay for books, theatre, concert, and museum, but not for the conversation 
about what you had read, heard, and seen,’ today ‘the conversation itself is administered’ and 
‘formalized’ via ‘professional dialogues from the podium, panel discussions, and round table 
shows …it assumes commodity form even at “conferences” where anyone can “participate”’ 
(1991: 163-6). 
An attendant colonization of public education occurs through the juridification of schooling, 
whereby norms and contexts for coordinating action based on mutual understanding become 
remodelled on the basis of legal principles transposed from the private law of the state 
(Habermas 1984: 356-8). As a consequence, ‘decision-making procedures’ that once treated 
those involved in the pedagogical process as having the mature capacity to ‘represent their 
own interests and to regular their affairs themselves’ become bureaucratically administered 
on behalf of those subjects as legal rights that penetrate ‘deep into the teaching and learning 
process’ (1984: 371-2). This process produces an abstraction from all particular pedagogic 
needs and interests that ultimately endangers the freedom and initiative of the teacher, while 
permitting the integration of education into the system of social labour, in terms of increasing 
productivity at the expense of cutting its ‘ties to the political, public realm’ (1984: 371; 1970, 
5-8). 
In his critical development of Habermas’ position, Honneth (1993a: xvii-xviii; 1981: 119-
120; 2007: 70-71) seeks to explain social development not according to an evolutionary logic 
of rationalization but a ‘dynamic of social struggle located within social interactions.’ A  
‘communication paradigm conceived not in terms of a theory of language, but in terms of a 
theory of recognition,’ Honneth (2007, 71-2; 1; 1995b, 146) argues, ‘can ultimately close the 
theoretical gap left by Habermas in his further development of Horkheimer’s program.’ One 
way in which social relations of recognition have been improved, Honneth (2014, 241-3) 
claims, is through comprehensive educational reforms. Although the political discourse of 
modernity frequently addressed the theme of public education, contemporary philosophy has 
neglected this insight into the intrinsic association between democratic politics and 
democratic education: that state-adminstered education is necessary for students to develop 
the reflective habits required to participate in democratic procedures. Honneth insists that a 
reinvigorated program of democratic education is therefore required, premised on the 
confidence that it is possible and necessary for state education to guide rational deliberation, 
infuse democratic values and goals and enable social recognition, promoting the individual 
self-respect and self-esteem that permits future citizens to act with self-confidence in the 
public sphere. 
As Nancy Fraser (2013: 169; Fraser and Honneth, 2003: 1-4, 28-30) and Seyla Benhabib 
(2002: 69-70) point out, however, the struggle for recognition must also address the way 
social institutes constitute ‘institutionalized patterns of cultural value’ that prevent parity of 
participation in social life, and so, insists, must concern itself with redistribution as well, 
since struggles ‘for recognition can be addressed by changing our cultural patterns of 
interpretation, communication, and representation’ in ways that ‘have distributive 
consequences,’ particularly with regard to schooling. Both Fraser (2003: 81-2) and Benhabib 
(2002: 101-2) focus on the banning of the hijab within public education systems in France 
and the need to take affirmative steps to ensure the right of minority groups to fully 
participate without requiring assimilation or exacerbating subordination. Simultaneously, 
however, schools ‘in democratic society have the special responsibility to prepare the young 
for citizenship …the capacity to engage others about how they will live together,’ and ‘any 
educational system that denies the exposure of children to the most advanced forms of 
knowledge and inquiry’ may, out of ‘respect for a minority community’s quest to preserve it 
ways of life,’ unjustifiably deny the equal right to develop moral and intellectual faculties as 
a full human being but also limit the social mobility of the young (Benhabib 2006: 101; 2002: 
47-8). Although controversies over the hijab generated ‘genuine public discourse in the 
French public sphere,’ the young women involved were not asked to justify ‘their actions 
with “good reasons in the public sphere”’ and so what Benhabib (2006: 105-7) understands as 
their attempt to resignify the meaning of wearing the hijab from one of private religious 
observance to politicized cultural defiance within the public sphere itself was overlooked and 
a genuine opportunity for social learning passed over.
To the extent that, through intersubjective theories of communicative action and recognition, 
the second and third generations of the Frankfurt School deepen the theoretical resources for 
conceptualizing and justifying both the scholarly production of knowledge and the conditions 
of its communication within the public sphere, their work can be seen as moving beyond the 
first generation in response to changed socio-economic conditions, in a way that nonetheless 
extends and historically generalizes what has been suggested is a problematically 
undialectical distinction between mimetic (unfree) and rational (free) education. In order to 
recover and reconstruct the outlines of an alternative critical theory of education from those 
more peripheral figures of the Institute, we might retrace the course of intellectual 
development just described by beginning with Honneth’s (1993a: 280-1; 2007: 74-5) 
criticism of the turn taken by critical theory in developing an account of intersubjectivity 
directly exclusively at rules of communication to the detriment of analysis of the bodily and 
physical dimensions of social action, including those involved in labour. 
In his early writings, Honneth sought to reconnect the concept of social labour back to a 
Marxist account of social emancipation by developing a critical understanding of work, in 
which the workers’ subversive efforts to gain control over the work revealed and justified the 
desire for autonomy over their activity. As Honneth (1995b: 16) makes clear, this draws on 
Marx’s early understanding of work not only in relation to economic growth or productivity 
but also from the position of practical self-development associated with Bildung. Here, social 
labour involves a formative, socializing and conscious learning process unrecognizable to 
Habermas, ‘in which working subjects become aware of the fact that their capabilities and 
needs go far beyond the possibilities permitted by the given social structure’ and  so ‘the 
educational potential of work’ becomes the practical ‘foundation of a theory of social 
revolution’ (1995b: 16, 23-5, 45-47). 
Although Honneth later develops this position into the more familiar Hegelian critique of the 
organization of labour on the basis of the need for social integration and recognition already 
discussed, this early attempt to reconceptualize labour in terms of the production not only of 
objective goods but also subjective learning processes provides a starting point for revising 
Honneth’s interpretation of Benjamin, in a way that will connect the latter more closely with 
the work of Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt. According to Honneth (1993b: 85-6) and 
Habermas (2000b), what ‘Benjamin in his early years had in mind …can, for all its 
metaphysical accentuation, indeed be rationally reconstructed,’ pointing to a form of 
experience in which ‘reality appears as a field of reference for intersubjective, lived 
experiences …tied to an ability peculiar to human species.’ Benjamin’s mimetic theory of 
language, Habermas (2000b: 214-6) claims, ‘is correct in supposing that the oldest semantic 
stratum is that of expression …one form of the animal instincts that is manifested in 
expressive movements’ and so ‘the as-yet-uninterruped connection of the human organism 
with surrounding nature.’ 
Honneth (2009: 115-6) elaborates this position in relation to that communicative sphere 
which Benjamin’s Critique of Violence identifies as ‘forms of social agreement that arise 
without any use of violence.’ This accords with Honneth’s (1993: 94) more general attempt 
to recode Benjamin’s idea of “messianic power” as a ‘symbolic restitution’ and recognition 
of the ‘moral integrity’ of the victims of the past. Yet Benjamin’s Critique of Violence also 
suggests an alternative domain of everyday experience in which a divine force is said to 
actualize itself in present practic: the sphere of education. For a ‘divine violence’, Benjamin 
writes, ‘is not only attested to by religious tradition but also found in present-day life in… 
educative violence, which in its perfected form stands outside the law.’ Yet, to the extent that 
Honneth (2009: 123-5), like Habermas, seeks to rationally redevelop Benjamin’s account of 
language as sphere of action free from coercion or violence, he is forced to reject such a 
conception of education as a ‘terroristic,’ ‘theocratic’ and ‘pathological’ justification of 
corporal punishment, one that reflects elements of the immature Benjamin’s involvement in 
the German Youth Movement and its program for anti-bourgeois educational reform. 
5. Counter-Education
Walter Benjamin’s concept of an educative violence provides the guiding thread, in this final 
section, to develop an alternative critical theory of counter-education, conjoining the thought 
of Walter Benjamin, whose writings on education have until recently tended to be overlooked 
in the Anglophone reception of his work, with that of Alexander Kluge and Oskar Negt, 
whose body of literary, theoretical and visual work remains the most interesting and, again in 
the Anglophone sphere at least, perhaps most neglected aspect of the Frankfurt School. The 
overlapping philosophical and educational concerns of these theorists can be attributed to 
their involvement in and experiences of the student movements of the 1910s and 1960s.
The educative violence that Benjamin associates with a paradoxically nonviolent form of 
divine violence is postulated from the existence of an anarchic, law-annihilating human 
violence (as a disruptive or interruptive expression of pure means without coercive end). 
Although it remains entirely speculative in the essay, this concept of educative violence could 
be developed in accordance with a contemporary allusion to the pedagogic gaze of the parent 
as a form of nonviolent control (Benjamin, 1999a: 284-5):
The growing child must conscious not just of the vigilance of the paternal eye but of 
what can ensue when the eye brightens or clouds over. This nonviolent control …has 
more influence on the child in essential matters than anything else (more than 
corporal punishment and above all more than the much-vaunted power of example). 
Benjamin makes clear that this pedagogic gaze is not merely contemplative but practical, 
effecting changes in both the object observed and the observing subject. If it therefore 
becomes an interpersonal medium of mutual transformation between generations, it is 
nonetheless predicated on the assertion by the educator of a form of nonviolent control, or 
what Benjamin (1999a: 487) in One-Way Street describes as a mastery not of the young but 
of the relationship between generations: 
But who would trust a flogging-master [Prügelmeister] who proclaimed the mastery 
[Beherrschung] of children by adults to be the purpose of education? Is not education, 
above all, the indispensable ordering of the relationship between generations and 
therefore mastery (if we are to use this term) of that relationship and not of children?’ 
The problematically violent mastery of students as the object of education is exemplified not 
only in the corporal punishment of authoritarian education, for Benjamin (2016: 196-8) but 
also in the ‘new pedagogy, the fun-loving reformism’ of progressive bourgeois schooling, 
which treats children, like commodity-producing European societies toward the rest of the 
world, as if primitively eager consumers of its own edifying cultural junk. This is also true of 
the ‘antiproletarian education for proletarians’ provided by the bourgeoisie and the 
‘pseudorevolutionary educational idealism’ of certain strands of Marxist education (Benjamin 
1999b: 274).
This idea could be developed in a more contemporary direction in the context of Marcuse’s 
(1965: 95-137) claims concerning forms of ‘educational dictatorship’ in which ‘violence and 
suppression are promulgated, practiced, and defended’ and ‘the people subjected to these 
governments are educated to sustain such practices as necessary for the preservation of the 
status quo.’ The practice of a passive form of tolerance within a framework determined by the 
authorities and a society defined by institutionalized inequality, ultimately serves the 
continuation of such oppression. The defence of freedom of speech that tolerates all points of 
view equally and treats even the most misinformed opinion with the same respect others 
results in a ‘neutralization of opposites, a neutralization, however, which takes place on the 
firm grounds of the structural limitation of tolerance and within a preformed mentality.’ 
Marcuse also sees abstract tolerance manifested within systems of education that understand 
the self-actualization of the child only in terms of permissiveness without any conception of a 
liberating kind of repression often necessary to transform psychic elements that permit self-
identity, and so ‘encourages non-conformity and letting-go in ways which leave the real 
engines of repression in the society entirely intact.’ 
Marcuse (1965) therefore speaks of the necessary ‘withdrawal of toleration of speech and 
assembly from groups and movements which promote aggressive policies, armament, 
chauvinism, discrimination on the grounds of race and religion, or which oppose the 
extension of public services’ and the need to connect political programs of education with 
organization within communities. ‘Today, education which counteracts the professional 
training for effective performance for the Establishment – counter-education,’ he writes 
(2001), ‘is the indispensable weapon of political radicalization.’
Marcuse’s concept of counter-education was significant for the development of Angela 
Davis’ (1998: 316-7) own attempt to link education and liberation in the context of the 
political and social struggles of the black community. In her earlier writings, she explores 
how this moment exemplified in the emancipation from slavery of the African-American 
social reformers Frederick Douglass, although Davis (2012: 194-7) is later critical of the way 
in which this early work relied on an ‘implicitly masculinist notion of freedom’ from the 
Kantian, Hegelian and Marxist philosophy she had learnt from the critical theory of Marcuse 
and Adorno, and which served to exclude women from enjoying the full benefits of freedom. 
Her later work (20012: 194-7) drew more fully on Afro-American and Feminist studies to 
link the philosophical understanding of freedom with histories of black political struggle and 
‘new ways of producing knowledge and transforming social relations’. While continuing to 
demand the elimination of institutional racism that excluded black students from higher 
education, Davis (1990: 180-1, 222-4) draws attention, for example, to the way in which 
sexuality could be used to deny the freedom of working-class black women, to how the 
academy cannot be the only site of political struggle against racism, sexism and homophobia, 
nor black women students and teachers the only groups that must be defended from attacks 
intended to deny their freedom, and how access to higher learning is conditioned by wider 
economic levels of impoverishment that cannot be addressed through educational solutions 
alone (Davis, 1990: 222-3). 
Davis’ attentiveness to how the subject of education and their subjective awareness of bodily 
and material dimensions of ‘race’, gender, sex, sexuality and class might produce not only of 
new kinds of knowledge but also new social relations resonates with Benjamin’s demand to 
rethink the relation between teaching and research. Benjamin (2011: 205) insists on the 
creative function of the student body as a ‘great transformer’ of scholarly methods within the 
university, to the extent that teaching is ‘capable of adapting to new strata of students in such 
a way that a rearrangement of the subject matter would give rise to entirely new forms of 
knowledge.’ Indeed, the sterility of academic research is attributed to the failure of its 
pedagogical task of turning teaching into a fruitful activity (Benjamin, 1999b: 459-461). For 
certain traditional subjects, then, it has become necessary to entirely re-examine the presumed 
association between teaching and research upon which academic activity is founded, and 
instead of looking ‘to research to lead a revival in teaching …strive with a certain 
intransigence for an – albeit very indirect – improvement in research to emerge from the 
teaching’ (Benjamin, 1999b: 419-20). 
One model for such a practice can be found in Benjamin’s own experiments with radio 
broadcasting in the late 1920 and early 1930s. Although radio’s civic education programs 
largely borrowed the existing forms of scholarly dissemination with minor concession to 
popularity, radio’s potential to address unlimited numbers simultaneously in their own homes 
required a complete rearrangement of the material in line with the interests and questions of 
the masses. This interplay ‘not only mobilizes knowledge in the direction of the public, but 
mobilizes the public in the direction of knowledge,’ transforming the substance of knowledge 
in a way that impacts on the pursuit of knowledge itself (Benjamin, 2014: 370)
These claims could be contextualized in relation to Negt and Kluge’s (1993: 147) call for the 
production of a proletarian counterpublic sphere: for ‘television, this is a matter of a stronger 
emphasis on educational programming …in the case of universities, it is one of developing a 
public media cartel indigenous to higher education; in the case of the unions, an 
intensification of the unions’ own professional training and adult education programs.’  Since 
the public sphere as it currently exists has been constituted as a bourgeois public sphere that 
excludes the experience of workers, Negt and Kluge (1993: 55-6, xlviii, 2-11) claim that their 
‘political motive is to uncouple the investigation of the public sphere …from its naturally 
rooted context …in the formal characteristics of communication’ and reject the idea it might 
be ‘interpreted’ or even ‘salvaged’ through ‘reference to the emphatic concept of a public 
sphere of the early bourgeoisie,’ modelled on a republic of scholars. 
For Fraser (1991: 57-60), the specific form in which Habermas elaborated the concept of the 
public sphere required ‘some critical interrogation and reconstruction,’ not only because 
Habermas idealizes the concept of the public sphere by overlooking the way it has been 
constituted by significant exclusions, especially along gender, ‘race’ and class lines, but also 
because he ‘fails to examine other, nonliberal, nonbourgeois competing public spheres.’ 
Kluge and Negt (1993: 30) argue that the production of a public sphere ‘in whose production 
process the historical movement of dead and living labour allows itself to be converted into 
experience’ is only possible within the framework of a ‘proletarian public sphere’ in which 
the workers can appropriate such an experience because they have already organized some of 
it themselves. This proletarian public sphere must develop within the historical fissures – ‘the 
rifts, marginal cases, isolated initiatives’ – of the concrete constellations of social forces that 
make up the bourgeois public sphere (Kluge & Negt, 1993: xliii) and so ‘does not stand for 
the working class but for oppressed relationships, for things and interests, which are not 
expressed …a process of igniting solidarity among people who might otherwise have very 
different ideas… (Krause, 2006). 
In their own writing, Kluge and Negt (2014: 106-7) offer a similar example of a primary 
school classroom where a teacher moves between children working in different groups, in 
which a form of self-regulated learning has been authorized that brings about ‘invisible forms 
of order.’ They insist that ‘it is not self-regulation in itself, but the form in which it has been 
authorized that brings about order’, pointing to the necessity of the teacher’s authorization – 
or pedagogic mastery of the relationship – for the forms of student self-regulation that rests 
on both their ‘own knowledge and their concomitant recognition of what the others are 
doing.’ This order could not have been produced by the ‘violent command’ or regimentation 
of a traffic policemen, they also argue, ‘because he would know nothing of the rules of right-
of-way and waiting that are in play,’ and would only direct children’s interests toward the 
imitation of adult political organization. 
Negt’s (1975: 29; trans. Zeuner 2013: 215)  attention to learning processes similarly focus on 
the educational value of the exemplary for enabling ‘learners …to translate, analytical-
scientific information into concrete and intelligible, non-scientific forms of language and 
thought, which in terms of their political and sociological substance can motivate for social 
action’. Such orientational or concrete thinking aims at the development of societal 
competencies by encouraging learners to uncover the relations between ‘the interest of the 
learning subjects and the objective world’ These societal competencies provide an alternative 
to vocational skills that education for productivity insists upon, permitting learners to 
understand existing relations within social life and initiate necessary reframing processes to 
rethink them. In contradistinction to Kant, the enlightenment is ‘not about the emergences 
from immaturity in and of itself’ as ‘primarily a solitary subjective labour,’ a transition that 
occurs at a single point through the power of autonomous, critical thought and speech. 
Rather, it is something that only emerges ‘collectively and as a side effect of multiple 
instances of paying and receiving attention’ (1993: 382-4). 
In contrast to progressive engagement through small seminars, Negt speaks of the pedagogic 
function of large lectures, as situations in which ‘public thinking’ – the gradual formation of 
ideas while speaking – can be performed that induces ‘unburdened listening’ to take place in 
which learners think for themselves in a condition of anonymity without the pressure ‘to not 
only look intelligent but also to say intelligent things’ (Krause, 2006: 9-10). To the extent this 
pedagogical relationship involves a ‘tender force,’ its basis is – in contrast to the Kantian 
formulation of enlightenment reason – not autonomy but collective insubordination, and its 
role is to violate inertia, throw into confusion, and dislodge individual motives (Negt & 
Kluge, 1993: 284-). Negt also teaches using ‘combinations … in order to create friction,’ 
bringing texts from antiquity into relation with everyday examples from the present; quoting 
texts in a foreign language and not immediately appending the translation in order, like 
Pestalozzi, to develop a sense of the otherness or alienness of the world; resisting the 
impatience of universal comprehensibility that only couples what can be rationally 
understood with what can be rationally understood so as to teach the important pedagogic 
principle of learning something with the senses so as to understand it later (Krause, 2006: 9).
As Habermas and others have already noted, the ‘logic of capital drives it to attempt to 
appropriate the full productivity of labour’ by developing certain qualities of labour power 
through the control of preschool and school socialization. What Adorno and Horkheimer 
characterized as the culture industry can now be conceived as the ‘preindustrial phase of the 
consciousness industry’ (Kluge & Negt, 2014: 157-8), including programming, advertising, 
publicity campaigns, traditional and new media, as well as other contexts of communication 
and learning, which now seeks direct access to the private sphere of individual perception, 
cognition and experience in order to pre-organize and valorize the raw material of workers’ 
consciousness in the interests of capital (Negt & Kluge, 1993: xlvii). This also means capital 
continues to stand in contradiction to living labour in a situation whose instability may still 
contain a revolutionary explosion. 
In providing a ‘political economy of labour power,’ Kluge and Negt (1981: 108, 135-6; 2014: 
n15, 7, 35) therefore focus on labour capacities as ‘autonomously protected reserves of labour 
power’ within the libidinal economy of living bodies; reserves which, unknown to 
consciousness, contain new forms of self-regulation and direction that constitute 
‘countercapital’. Seeking to determine the contradiction between capital and labour anew 
from the side of living labour rather than, as Marx had done, capital, Kluge and Negt’s work 
therefore provides a powerful inversion of theories of human capital that have sought to 
transform education in the pursuit of economic productivity. Benjamin (1917: C 94-95; 1929: 
272-3) insisted that the great error underlying bourgeois education was the tacit belief that 
children need us more than we need them; with regard to the educational labour, the same 
learning subjects might instead be seen as ‘helpers, avengers, liberators’ (Benjamin, 1929: 
273).
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